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What	are	Adaptive	Preferences?	
Exclusion	and	Disability	in	the	Capability	Approach		[Draft.	Final	version	published	in	Journal	of	Applied	Philosophy	(2015).]		
Abstract:	It	is	a	longstanding	problem	for	theorists	of	justice	that	many	victims	of	injustice	
seem	to	prefer	mistreatment,	and	perpetuate	their	own	oppression.	One	possible	response	is	
to	 simply	 ignore	 such	preferences	as	unreliable	 ‘adaptive	preferences’.	Capability	 theorists	
have	taken	this	approach,	arguing	that	individuals	should	be	entitled	to	certain	capabilities	
regardless	of	their	satisfaction	without	them.	Although	this	initially	seems	plausible,	worries	
have	been	 raised	 that	undermining	 the	 reliability	 of	 individuals’	 strongly-held	preferences	
impugns	 their	 rationality,	 and	 further	 excludes	 already	marginalised	groups.	 I	 argue	 that	
such	criticisms	trade	on	an	ambiguity	between	two	uses	of	the	term	‘adaptive	preference’.	An	
adaptive	 preference	 is	 often	 assumed	 to	 be	 irrational,	 and	 an	 unreliable	 guide	 to	 its	
possessor’s	best	interests.	However,	I	suggest	a	preference	may	also	be	adaptive	in	the	sense	
that	it	is	an	unreliable	guide	to	our	distributive	entitlements,	and	that	this	does	not	require	
an	assessment	of	 individuals’	rationality.	I	consider	this	distinction	in	relation	to	disability,	
arguing	 that	 this	 clarification	 allows	 us	 to	 justifiably	 ignore	 some	 disabled	 individuals’	
preferences,	 in	the	context	of	theorising	about	distributive	justice,	without	disrespecting	or	
undermining	their	rationality	or	culture.		
	
1.	Introduction		It	is	a	longstanding	problem	for	theorists	of	justice	that	many	victims	of	injustice	seem	to	perpetuate	their	own	oppression.	For	example,	those	who	choose	to	stay	with	an	abusive	partner,	 or	 sufferers	 of	 Stockholm	 syndrome	 (wherein	 a	 kidnap	 victim	 feels	 trust	 or	affection	for	their	captor).	In	conditions	of	great	hardship	or	deprivation	individuals	may	cope	with	their	circumstances	by	claiming	to	prefer	their	situation	to	any	alternative.	Yet	it	would	be	highly	implausible	to	think	such	preferences	should	legitimate	these	practices,	or	be	taken	as	reliable	evidence	about	these	individuals’	well-being:	“women’s	compliance	with	sexist	norms	[for	example]	does	not	legitimate	those	norms”1.			Unreliable	adaptive	preferences	are	particularly	problematic	 for	 theories	of	distributive	justice,	where	preferences	may	play	a	role	in	determining	the	goods	or	opportunities	an	
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individual	 is	entitled	to.	Yet	the	 fact	 that	a	kidnap	victim	does	not	desire	release	should	not	mean	they	are	not	entitled	to	freedom,	nor	should	a	woman’s	satisfaction	with	fewer	material	resources	mean	they	are	entitled	to	less.	This	problem	is	starkest	for	preference-satisfaction	 welfarists	 for	 whom	 the	 unreliability	 of	 individuals’	 stated	 preferences	translates	 directly	 into	 an	 unreliable	 theory	 of	 distributive	 justice.	 Indeed,	 the	 idea	 of	adaptive	 preferences	 was	 initially	 developed	 as	 a	 critique	 of	 welfarist	 theories	 that	“take…account	of	wants	only	as	they	are	given”2,	and	so	assume	that	those	who	claim	to	be	satisfied	are,	indeed,	satisfied,	and	entitled	to	nothing	further.			A	possible	 response	 is	 to	 give	 individuals’	 preferences	 a	 less	direct	 role	 in	determining	what	constitutes	a	just	distribution,	and	to	ignore	preferences	such	as	those	described	as	unreliable	 ‘adaptive	preferences’.	Capability	 theorists	have	 taken	 this	approach,	arguing	that	 individuals	 should	be	entitled	 to	certain	capabilities	 regardless	of	 their	 satisfaction	without	 them.	Rather	 than	a	person’s	preference	determining	 their	specific	entitlement,	we	 should	 come	 to	 an	 overlapping	 consensus	 on	 the	 opportunities	 necessary	 for	 a	flourishing	 life,	which	 all	 individuals	 are	 then	 entitled	 to	 (the	 central	 capabilities).3	 Yet	only	 those	with	reliable	preferences	 should	be	 included	 in	 this	 consensus,	 and	adaptive	preferences	are	 taken	 to	be	amongst	 those	 that	 can	be	 legitimately	 ignored.	 If	 a	kidnap	victim,	for	example,	repudiates	freedom,	this	will	not	be	taken	as	evidence	that	we	are	not	entitled	to	the	capability	for	freedom:	it	will	remain	amongst	those	considered	central.			In	this	way,	capability	theorists	can	take	account	of	preferences,	yet,	unlike	welfarists,	can	identify	 and	 ignore	 adaptive	 preferences,	 and	 so	 avoid	 ingrained	 mistreatment	 and	oppression	being	formalised	into	the	dictates	of	a	theory	of	justice.	However,	whilst	this	response	is	uncontroversial	in	paradigmatic	cases,	it	has	been	objected	that	undermining	the	 reliability	 of	 individuals’	 strongly	 held	 preferences	 further	 excludes	 already	marginalised	 groups.	 Characterising	 the	 preferences	 of	 oppressed	 and	 vulnerable	minorities	as	unreliable,	and	 those	who	hold	 them	as	 irrational	and	 “defective	agents”4,	may	weaken	the	credentials	of	the	capability	approach	as	committed	to	social	justice	and	inclusion.	For	example,	it	has	been	suggested	that,	although	the	approach	prides	itself	on	being	robustly	feminist,	 it	unjustifiably	classes	the	preferences	of	third-world	women	as	adaptive,	 disregarding	 their	 autonomy	 and	 status	 as	 agents.5	 Similarly,	 despite	Nussbaum’s	 claims	 that	 the	 approach	 is	 better	 placed	 to	 accommodate	 disability	 than	alternative	 theories,6	 Elizabeth	 Barnes	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 capability	 approach	 will	exclude	the	preferences	of	many	(physically)	disabled	people	as	adaptive	(§2).7		
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	I	will	argue	(§3)	that	such	criticisms	trade	on	an	ambiguity	between	two	uses	of	the	term	‘adaptive	preferences’	in	the	distributive	justice	literature.	To	say	a	preference	is	adaptive	
may	mean	it	is	irrational,	and	a	poor	guide	to	that	persons’	interests.	I	call	these	well-being	
adaptive	preferences.	It	is	for	judging	individuals’	preferences	adaptive	in	this	sense	that	capability	theorists	are	criticised.	However,	I	will	argue,	this	is	not	usually	what	capability	theorists	 mean	 when	 they	 judge	 a	 preference	 to	 be	 adaptive.	 To	 say	 a	 preference	 is	adaptive,	 then,	 may	 simply	 mean	 that	 it	 is	 an	 unreliable	 guide	 to	 our	 redistributive	entitlements.	 This	 need	 say	 nothing	 about	 the	 rationality	 of	 the	 individual	 holding	 the	preference,	 and	 so	 does	 not	 necessitate	 insulting	 or	 paternalist	 judgements	 about	someone’s	incompetent	or	defective	agency.	I	call	these	justice	adaptive	preferences.			This	distinction	has	not	been	explicitly	acknowledged,	perhaps	because	from	a	welfarist	perspective	it	collapses.	For	welfarists,	our	interests	directly	determine	our	entitlements.	Therefore,	if	individuals	are	a	reliable	guide	to	their	best	interests,	they	are	also	a	reliable	guide	to	their	distributive	entitlements	(and	vice	versa).	Yet,	for	non-welfarist	theories	of	distributive	justice,	this	distinction	is	salient.	I	will	consider	its	implications	for	capability	theorists’	 treatment	 of	 disabled	 individuals,	 and	 argue:	 first,	 that	 their	 preferences	will	not	 ordinarily	 be	 excluded	 (from	 determining	 our	 distributive	 entitlements)	 and	 that,	despite	 the	 frequent	 dismissal	 of	 disabled	 individuals’	 preferences,	 they	 should	 not	 be;	and	 second,	 that	 individuals’	preferences	 can	be	 so	excluded	without	 implying	 they	are	unreliable	 or	 irrational	 agents	 (§4).	 Clarifying	 what	 it	 means	 to	 deem	 a	 preference	‘adaptive’	allows	capability	theorists	(and	other	non-welfarists)	to	respond	to	accusations	that	they	exclude	and	undermine	the	voices	of	oppressed	minorities,	yet	without	allowing	our	distributive	entitlements	to	be	dictated	by	those	who	have	adapted	to	mistreatment.		
2.	The	Problem	of	Adaptive	Preferences		There	is	a	sense	in	which	all	our	preferences	are	adaptive,	insofar	as	they	are	informed	by	environmental	factors	such	as	the	options	we	can	reasonably	expect	to	be	available	to	us,	and	 internal	 factors	 such	 as	 a	 reasonable	 assessment	 of	 our	 own	 abilities.	 The	 term	‘adaptive	 preferences’	 distinguishes	 adaptations	 that	 undermine	 the	 reliability	 of	 our	preferences	 from	 those	 that	 do	 not.	 Standard	 accounts	 of	 adaptive	 preferences	 –	developed	by	Elster	and	his	 critics	–	model	 the	notion	on	Aesop	and	La	Fontaine’s	 ‘Fox	and	Grapes’	 parable.	On	 realising	he	 cannot	 reach	 the	 grapes	he	desires,	 the	 fox	 insists	
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‘grapes	 are	 too	 sour	 for	 foxes’,	 and	 he	 did	 not	 want	 them	 anyway.	 It	 is	 assumed	 this	response	is	irrational,	and	not	a	reflection	of	his	best	interests.			Standard	accounts	root	this	irrationality	in	procedural	flaws	in	the	process	of	preference	formation.	For	example,	 that	 the	preferences	were	 formed	unconsciously	or	necessarily	unconsciously	 (the	 fox	 did	 not	 consciously	 change	 his	 preferences	 in	 light	 of	 his	diminished	options),	or	do	not	cohere	with	our	other	beliefs	and	preferences	(for	the	fox,	regarding	 the	 ideal	 sweetness	of	 fruit).8	 Such	accounts	 aim	 to	 capture	 the	 idea	 that	 the	fox’s	 preference	 is	 unreliable	 because	 he	 seems	 to	 be	 ‘fooling	 himself’:	 he	 has	 failed	 to	acknowledge	his	limitations,	or	recognise	that	the	real	reason	he	no	longer	prefers	grapes	does	not	concern	their	sourness.	If	the	fox’s	response	to	being	unable	to	reach	the	grapes	were	to	consciously	cultivate	a	preference	for	a	sweeter,	lower-hanging	fruit,	this	would	not	be	an	adaptive	preference.		Thus,	these	accounts	distinguish	rational,	conscious,	and	autonomous	character	planning	in	 light	of	diminished	options,	 from	irrational,	unconscious,	and	heteronomous	adaptive	
preferences.	 Nussbaum	 rejects	 such	 proceduralist	 accounts	 and	 argues	 that	 “[Elster]	needs	something	he	does	not	give	us,	a	substantive	theory	of	justice	and	central	goods”.9	Nussbaum	 therefore	 proposes	 a	 substantive	 normative	 account,	 according	 to	 which	adaptive	preferences	are	those	with	the	‘wrong’	content	(§2.1).	Barnes	argues	that	those	who	prefer	their	disabled	life	will	have	the	‘wrong’	preferences	by	Nussbaum’s	standards,	and	 will	 be	 duly	 excluded	 from	 the	 capability	 approach	 (§2.2).	 I	 accept	 many	 of	Nussbaum’s	 criticisms	 of	 pure	 proceduralist	 approaches,	 and	 accept,	 too,	 much	 of	Barnes’s	 critique	 of	 Nussbaum’s	 substantive	 account.	 I	 therefore	 propose	 a	 substantive	
proceduralist	account	of	adaptive	preference	identification	(§3).			
2.1	Nussbaum’s	Normative	Account	of	Adaptive	Preferences		Nussbaum	argues	that	we	should	not	be	“suspicious	of	any	desire	that	is	formed	through	adjustment	to	reality”10,	and	that	it	is	not	whether	a	desire	is	formed	unconsciously	that	determines	whether	it	should	be	ignored:	many	unconscious	adaptations	are	considered	reliable.	 For	 example,	 adjusting	 our	 aspirations	 to	 the	 fact	 that	we	will	 never	 fulfil	 our	childhood	dreams	to	be	the	best	opera	singer,	or	basketball	player,	in	the	world	“is	often	a	good	thing”11.	We	do	not,	therefore,	distrust	the	adult’s	revised	career	preferences,	even	if	the	revision	is	unconscious.		
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	Thus,	 instead	 of	 using	 the	 process	 of	 preference	 formation	 to	 identify	 adaptive	preferences,	 Nussbaum	 focuses	 on	 their	 problematic	 content:	 “change	 in	 preferences	 is	only	problematic	 insofar	as	it	 leads	to	a	preference	for	something	which	one	should	not,	ceteris	 paribus,	 prefer”12.	 For	Nussbaum,	 even	placing	 substantive	 conditions	 –	 such	 as	“an	 absence	 of	 traditional	 hierarchy,	 absence	 of	 fear,	 and	 a	 sense	 of	 one’s	 worth	 and	dignity”13	 –	 on	 the	 process	 of	 preference	 formation	 is	 insufficient.	 Such	 informed-preference	accounts	are	no	more	than	a	convenient	heuristic	device	for	Nussbaum,	useful	only	insofar	as	they	generate	preferences	for	those	things	we	ought	to	value.14		For	 example,	 considering	 educational	 videos	 produced	 by	 SEWA	 (Self-Employed	Women’s	Organisation),	encouraging	women	to	have	a	greater	awareness	of	their	options,	Nussbaum	notes:		we	would	not	think	this	progress,	or	a	correction	of	malformed	preferences	in	the	direction	of	 `true'	preferences,	 if	 the	women	were	 taught	by	 the	videos	 to	hide	away	 in	the	house	all	day,	or	 to	believe	that	 they	were	made	for	physical	abuse…It	is	because	we	have	an	implicit	theory	of	value	that	holds	self-respect	and	 economic	 agency	 to	 be	 important	 goods	 that	 we	 think	 the	 preferences	constructed	by	the	videos	are	good...15	Thus,	it	is	not	raising	of	awareness	per	se	that	makes	the	videos	valuable,	but	the	fact	that	they	are	raising	awareness	and	moulding	preferences	in	the	right	direction.				Capability	theorists	have	reason	to	promote	informed	choice:	it	demonstrates	the	central	capability	 for	 practical	 reason,	 which	 ‘suffuses’,	 and	 is	 essential	 to,	 the	 exercise	 of	 all	capabilities.	However,	 for	Nussbaum,	a	more	 informed,	or	 considered,	preference	 is	not	necessarily	 more	 reliable	 than	 a	 habituated,	 and	 unconsidered,	 preference.	 On	 the	contrary,	 if	 an	 unconsidered	 preference	 is	 for	 a	 good	 way	 of	 life	 (economic	empowerment)	and	a	considered	preference	is	not	(physical	abuse),	it	is	the	former	that	is	reliable.	As	Nussbaum	puts	it,	“[a]	habituated	preference	not	to	have	an	item	on	the	list	[of	 central	 functionings]…will	 not	 count	 in	 the	 social	 choice	 function,	 and	 the	 equally	habituated	preference	to	have	these	things	will	count”16.				 	
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2.2	Preferences	in	the	Capability	Approach		Barnes	objects	to	this	approach	on	the	basis	that	it	will	identify	the	wrong	preferences	as	adaptive	and,	in	particular,	will	unjustifiably	deem	disabled	individuals’	preferences	to	be	adaptive.	 She	 insists	 that	 “[p]hysical	 disability	 represents,	 according	 to	 the	 capabilities	approach,	 an	 absence	 of	 one	 or	 more	 basic	 goods	 (bodily	 integrity,	 physical	 health	etc…)”17.	 As	 such,	 Barnes	 suggests	 that	 “[a]	 disabled	 life,	 according	 to	 the	 capabilities	approach	 cannot	 be	 as	 optimal	 as	 a	 relevantly	 similar	 non-disabled	 life”18.	 If	 Barnes’s	characterisation	is	right,	Nussbaum	must	treat	disabled	people’s	preference	for	their	life	as	unreliable,	 since	 to	prefer	 the	 ‘sub-optimal’	 (in	response	 to	diminished	options)	 is	 to	have	 an	 adaptive	 preference,	 on	 her	 view.	 These	 preferences	will	 be	 deemed	merely	 a	coping	mechanism,	developed	in	response	to	tragic	circumstances,	and	will	be	ignored.19			To	appreciate	the	force	of	the	criticism	that	disabled	individuals’	preferences	are	ignored,	we	 must	 clarify	 the	 role	 preferences	 play	 in	 the	 capability	 approach.	 First,	 on	 most	accounts,	 they	are	used	to	 identify	which	capabilities	should	count	as	 ‘central’,	and	so	a	concern	 of	 justice.	 Second,	 our	 preference	 in	 a	 particular	 case	 determines	whether	we	exercise	a	capability,	and	perform	a	functioning,	or	not.	For	example,	our	preference	will	determine	how	much	food	we	eat,	though	we	should,	nonetheless,	have	the	capability	to	be	fully	nourished	if	this	is	as	a	central	capability.	I	will	not	focus	on	this	latter	role	since	capability	 theorists	 are	 unlikely	 to	 use	 the	 idea	 of	 adaptive	 preferences	 to	 compel	individuals	to	perform	particular	functionings,	contrary	to	their	preferences.	Even	if	they	insist	that	some	functionings	are	central	to	well-being,	most	acknowledge	that	it	is	either	counter-productive	 to	 override	 a	 preference	 not	 to	 perform	 them,	 or	 an	 unacceptable	violation	of	autonomy.20			It	 is	 the	 former	 role	 on	 which	 I	 will	 focus,	 then,	 according	 to	 which	 preferences	 have	epistemic	value,	providing	evidence	of	what	is	good	for	people,	and	so	which	capabilities	ought	 to	be	 central.	Nussbaum	hopes	 that	 if	 individuals	undergo	a	process	of	 reflective	equilibrium,	testing	their	considered	moral	judgements	against	their	conception	of	what	a	flourishing	 life	 entails,	we	 can	 reach	an	overlapping	 consensus	on	 the	 functionings	 that	are	 central	 to	 human	 life	 amongst	 a	 large,	 cross-cultural	 group.	 We	 should	 then	 be	provided	 the	 capability	 to	perform	 these	 functionings,	which,	 she	 suggests,	will	 include	nourishment,	bodily	health,	bodily	integrity,	practical	reason,	and	emotional	attachments.	However,	 if	 there	 is	 intransigent	 disagreement	 on	 what	 these	 capabilities	 should	 be,	
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capability	theorists	face	a	dilemma:	either	they	must	remove	a	capability	on	the	basis	that	it	 cannot	 be	 the	 object	 of	 an	 overlapping	 consensus,	or	 suggest	 that	 the	 preferences	 of	those	who	repudiate	it	are	unreliable	(perhaps	adaptive),	and	should	be	excluded.21			This	 may	 seem	 a	 slightly	 unnatural	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘preferences’,	 since	 we	 are	 not	concerned	with	how	individuals	want	their	own	lives	to	go,	but	with	their	views	on	what	constitutes	 a	 flourishing	 life.	 Yet	 if	 an	 individual	 prefers	 their	 life	 without	 a	 central	capability,	and	considers	 it	 flourishing,	this	 implies	they	judge	this	capability	 inessential	to	 flourishing.	Our	concern,	 then,	would	not	be	the	celibate	monk	who	sees	the	value	of	the	opportunity	 for	sexual	satisfaction,	 for	example,	but	chooses	 to	 forgo	 it.	Rather,	 it	 is	with	asexual	individuals,	who	consider	sexual	satisfaction	to	be	unimportant	and	their	life	without	this	opportunity	to	be	flourishing.22			Barnes’s	 criticism	 is	 that	 capability	 theorists	will	 put	 disabled	 individuals	 in	 this	 latter	category.	She	argues	that	disabled	individuals	lack	one	or	more	of	the	central	capabilities,	yet	many	flourish	without	them.	If	Barnes	is	right	that	disability	must	involve	capability	deprivation,	then	capability	theorists	will,	indeed,	face	the	dilemma	of	either	disregarding	their	preference	for	their	capability-less	life	as	unreliably	adaptive,	or	concluding	that	the	capability	 is	 not	 essential	 after	 all.	 Barnes	 suggests	 capability	 theorists	 opt	 for	 the	 first	horn	of	this	dilemma,	and	exclude	them.23			Excluding	the	preferences	of	any	disabled	individual	who	considers	their	life	flourishing	on	 the	 basis	 that	 valuing	 their	 ‘sub-optimal’	 life	 makes	 their	 preferences	 unreliable	 is,	indeed,	unjustified	and	 insulting.	Moreover,	Nussbaum’s	method	of	 identifying	adaptive	preferences	 may	 seem	 to	 generate	 a	 vicious	 circle:	 the	 list	 of	 central	 capabilities	 is	developed	 through	 discussion	 with	 those	 who	 have	 reliable	 preferences,	 but	 our	preferences	 are	 only	 reliable	 if	 we	 value	 the	 central	 capabilities.	 Thus,	 the	 approach	seems	in	danger	of	applying	only	to	those	who	already	accept	it,	and	disabled	individuals	may	not	be	amongst	this	group.			
3.	What	are	Adaptive	Preferences?		Barnes’s	critique	of	the	capability	approach,	then,	initially	seems	damaging.	To	determine	whether	it	 is	 fair,	however,	more	needs	to	be	said	about	how	both	adaptive	preferences	and	disability	should	be	properly	understood.	I	will	therefore	draw	a	distinction	between	
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well-being	and	justice	adaptive	preferences	(§3.1),	and	suggest	an	alternative	method	of	adaptive	preference	 identification	 in	 the	capability	approach	(§3.2).	 I	will	 then	consider	disability,	and	argue	that	Barnes	is	wrong	to	suggest	capability	theorists	will	exclude	all	disabled	individuals’	preferences,	and	wrong,	too,	to	suggest	all	such	preferences	should	be	included	(§4).			
3.1	Well-Being	Adaptive	or	Justice	Adaptive?		As	§2	discussed,	the	paradigm	example	of	adaptive	preferences	is	the	fabled	fox	and	his	sour	grapes.	The	 fox	has	been	 led	by	 the	 inaccessibility	of	 the	grapes	 to	 the	 false	belief	that	they	are	too	sour	for	foxes,	and	so	deceives	himself	that	he	does	not	really	want	them.	His	process	of	preference	formation	is	 flawed,	and	the	resulting	preference	is	 irrational,	and	a	poor	guide	to	his	interests.	When	an	individual’s	preference	is	adaptive	in	this	sense	their	well-being	would	 improve	 if	 they	 (a)	 repudiated	 their	 current	preference,	 and	 (b)	achieved	the	object	of	 their	new	preference.	The	 fox	would	be	better	off	 if	he	preferred	grapes	and	was	able	to	reach	them.	The	kidnap	victim	would	be	better	off	if	they	desired	their	freedom	and	escaped.			When	individuals	have	such	preferences	–	that	are	formed	irrationally,	and	do	not	reflect	their	best	 interests	–	they	have	well-being	adaptive	preferences.	However,	 I	suggest	that	this	 is	not	always	what	 theorists	of	distributive	 justice	have	 in	mind	when	 they	discuss	adaptive	 preferences.	 Instead,	 they	 may	 mean	 preferences	 which,	 though	 rationally	formed,	 are	 an	 unreliable	 guide	 to	 just	 distributive	 entitlements.	 Preferences	 may	 be	deemed	adaptive	in	this	sense	without	an	ascription	of	defective	agency.	These	are	justice	
adaptive	preferences.			An	example	may	illustrate	this	distinction.	Sen	has	used	the	self-reported	levels	of	health	of	widows	and	widowers	 in	 India	 in	1944,	 following	 the	Great	Bengal	Famine,	 to	argue	convincingly	 against	 the	 welfarist	 reliance	 on	 preferences.	 Although	 widows	 actually	suffered	 a	 greater	 rate	 of	 malnutrition	 and	 associated	 health	 problems,	 only	 2.5%	reported	their	health	to	be	‘ill’	or	‘indifferent’,	as	opposed	to	48.5%	of	widowers.24	Sen’s	point	is	that	welfarists	would	prioritise	healthcare	for	widowers	on	the	basis	of	such	data,	ignoring	 the	 fact	 that	 women’s	 subordinate	 role,	 particularly	 within	 the	 family,	 means	they	are	accustomed	to,	and	expect,	much	lower	levels	of	nourishment	and	health,	and	so	are	 satisfied	with	 less.	 By	 giving	 preferences	 a	 less	 direct	 role,	 capability	 theorists	 can	
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hold	 that	 a	 just	 distribution	 should	 ensure	 that	 all	 individuals	 have	 certain	 valuable	capabilities	 –	 in	 this	 case,	 for	 nourishment	 and	 bodily	 health	 –	 regardless	 of	 the	satisfaction	it	produces.			That	women	are	used	to	giving	up	their	own	food	to	ensure	their	husband	and	children	are	nourished	should	not	mean	 their	malnourishment	 is	any	 less	a	priority	 than	 that	of	men	 who	 are	 less	 used	 to	 doing	 without.	 Therefore,	 not	 allowing	 the	 widows’	contentment	 to	 guide	 distributive	 policy	 –	 excluding	 their	 preferences	 as	 unreliably	adaptive	 –	 initially	 seems	 uncontroversial.	 However,	 we	must	 distinguish	 the	 different	senses	in	which	their	preferences	may	be	adaptive.	First,	they	may	be	well-being	adaptive,	such	that	their	claim	that	they	are	satisfied	with	their	health	is	a	poor	guide	to	their	actual	well-being:	 they	would	 be	 better	 off	 if	 they	 preferred,	 and	 achieved,	 better	 health	 and	nourishment.	On	this	view,	they	irrationally	‘fool	themselves’	into	believing	their	health	is	not	indifferent,	and	are	unconscious	of	the	real	reasons	for	their	preference.			Yet	this	may	not	be	true	in	many	cases.	As	Serene	Khader	points	out,	when	the	widows’	circumstances	 are	 unlikely	 to	 change,	 their	 preferences	may	 be	 a	 rational	 response	 to	their	 deprivation,	 not	 a	 sign	 they	 are	 defective	 agents.25	 For	 example,	 prioritising	 their	children’s	nourishment	and	preferring	their	own	malnourishment	may	be	a	good	guide	to	their	best	 interests	 if	 they	are	more	concerned	for	their	children’s	well-being	than	their	own	 or,	 more	 self-interestedly,	 if,	 being	 nourished,	 their	 children	 can	 look	 after	 them	later.26	 Their	 preference	 for	 malnourishment,	 and	 satisfaction	 with	 ill-health,	 may,	therefore,	 be	 rational	 and	 representative	 of	 their	 best	 interests	 (and	 so	 not	well-being	adaptive).	Nonetheless,	Sen’s	criticism	remains	convincing,	and	these	preferences	do	not	give	 us	 any	 reason	 to	 prioritise	 the	 healthcare	 of	 widowers	 (or	 other	 widows)	 less	concerned	with	their	children’s	well-being,	for	example.	Thus,	some	preferences	that	are	
rational	adaptations	may	be	a	poor	guide	to	our	distributive	entitlements,	and	should	be	overlooked	for	the	purposes	of	justice	(justice	adaptive	preferences).			In	summary,	then,	a	well-being	adaptive	preference	is	a	poor	guide	to	our	best	interests,	and	is	likely	to	be	procedurally	irrational.	A	justice	adaptive	preference	is	a	poor	guide	to	the	requirements	of	(distributive)	justice,	and	may	be	rational,	and	representative	of	our	best	interests	(in	an	unjust	social	context).	These	categories	are	not	mutually-exclusive:	a	preference	may	be	both,	or	either,	or	neither.	For	example:		
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(i) The	preferences	of	 a	 sufferer	of	 Stockholm	syndrome	are	both	well-being	and	justice	 adaptive.	 Not	 only	 would	 they	 be	 better	 off	 if	 they	 preferred	 their	freedom	 and	 escaped,	 they	 are	 entitled	 to	 this	 freedom,	 and	 their	 preference	should	not	undermine	their	(or	others’)	entitlement	to	it.		(ii) The	 fox,	 by	 contrast,	 has	 preferences	 that	 are	 well-being,	 but	 not	 justice,	adaptive.	He	would	be	better	off	if	he	preferred	and	reached	his	grapes,	but	he	is	not	entitled	to	them.	Therefore,	these	preferences	are	not	concerns	of	justice.27	Similarly,	a	deaf	person’s	preference	for	a	life	without	music	(§4),	or	someone’s	preference	 for	 the	music	 to	which	 they	have	been	exposed,	may	be	well-being	adaptive,	 insofar	 as	 they	 are	 unconscious	 of	 their	 reasons	 for	 this	 preference,	and	 their	 well-being	 may	 improve	 if	 they	 repudiated	 it	 and	 experienced	 the	alternative.	Yet,	again,	such	adaptations	are	not	a	matter	of	justice.		(iii) The	 widows	 whose	 preference	 for	 malnourishment	 and	 ill-health	 is	 rational,	and	a	good	guide	 to	 their	 interests,	under	 the	 (tragic)	 circumstances	 in	which	they	 find	 themselves,	 have	 preferences	 that	 are	 justice,	 but	 not	 well-being,	adaptive.	 They	 may	 be	 a	 reliable	 guide	 to	 their	 interests,	 but	 they	 are	 an	
unreliable	guide	to	their	(and	others’)	entitlement.		(iv) Individuals	who	have	rational	and	reliable	preferences	to	be	nourished,	or	free	from	captivity,	have	preferences	that	are	neither	well-being	nor	justice	adaptive.		The	third	category	is	of	most	interest,	since	it	covers	cases	where	individuals’	preferences	should	 be	 excluded	 or	 ignored,	 though	 we	 do	 not	 distrust	 their	 rational	 agency.	 This	allows	 capability	 theorists	 to	 avoid	 their	 list	 of	 capabilities	 being	 determined	 by	individuals	who	have	adapted	to	deprivation,	without	impugning	the	rationality	of	those	they	 exclude.	 Hence,	 deeming	 an	 individual’s	 preferences	 adaptive	 need	 not	 be	 as	disrespectful	as	 is	often	supposed.	To	defend	 this	 conclusion,	an	account	of	how	 justice	adaptive	preferences	can	be	identified	is	needed.			
3.2	Capability	Deprivation	and	Adaptive	Preference	Identification		In	brief,	I	will	suggest	that	we	have	a	warrant	to	diagnose	a	preference	as	justice	adaptive	if	 it	was	 formed	 in	 the	 absence	of	 central	 capabilities	 (to	 a	minimum	 threshold).	When	identifying	preferences	that	are	unreliable	 from	the	point	of	view	of	 justice,	Nussbaum	is	right	to	criticise	Elster	for	the	absence	of	a	substantive	theory	of	justice	and	central	goods	in	his	account.	A	pure	proceduralist	account	is	insufficient	to	identify	the	preferences	that	
11	
would	 distort	 a	 theory	 of	 justice.	 Yet	 this	 need	 not	 lead	 us	 to	 abandon	 proceduralism	altogether,	since	content	alone	also	does	not	determine	whether	we	consider	a	preference	reliable.	For	example,	the	preference	for	an	ascetic	lifestyle	of	someone	who	has	chosen	to	enter	a	religious	order	does	not	seem	problematically	adaptive,	whilst	the	preference	of	a	woman	 in	 a	 patriarchal	 society	 for	 the	 same	 lack	 of	 material	 comforts	 may	 be.	 The	difference	lies	in	the	process	of	preference	formation:	the	former	individual	(I	stipulate)	had	alternative	options,	was	more	informed,	and	free	from	external	pressure.			The	method	of	adaptive	preference	identification	I	advocate,	then,	is	a	form	of	substantive	proceduralism.	 A	 substantive	 element	 is	 essential	 to	 eliminate	 “corrupt	 or	 mistaken”	preferences.28	 This	 should	 at	 least	 require	 that	 preferences	 be	 appropriately	 informed,	and	 this	 necessitates	 some	 experience	 of	 the	 central	 capabilities	 that	 individuals	 are	asked	to	form	preferences	about.	As	Nussbaum	notes:	When	people	 are	 respected	 as	 equals,	 and	 free	 from	 intimidation,	 and	able	 to	learn	about	the	world,	and	secure	against	desperate	want,	their	judgments...are	likely	 to	 be	 more	 reliable	 than	 judgments	 formed	 under	 the	 pressure	 of	ignorance	and	fear	and	desperate	need.29	However,	whilst	Nussbaum	gives	a	limited	and	ancillary	justificatory	role	to	preferences,	even	when	 appropriately	 informed,	 I	 suggest	 proceduralism	 should	 be	more	 central	 to	justifying	capabilities.			My	approach	does	not	generate	the	same	vicious	circle	as	Nussbaum’s,	according	to	which	the	approach	only	applies	 to	 those	who	already	accept	 it.	Whilst	Nussbaum	 insists	 that	individuals	 must	 value	 the	 central	 capabilities,	 I	 only	 argue	 that	 they	 must	 have	 the	chance	 to	 exercise	 them,	 before	 their	 rejection	 of	 them	 can	 be	 deemed	 reliable.	 An	individual’s	preference	 is	only	excluded	(from	the	overlapping	consensus	on	the	central	capabilities)	 if	 they	 have	 not	 experienced	 the	 opportunity	 they	 reject.	 For	 example,	 a	woman’s	preference	for	economic	disempowerment	is	only	 justice	adaptive	if	she	lacked	the	 opportunity	 for	 economic	 empowerment	 when	 she	 formed	 this	 preference.	 In	 the	process	of	arriving	at	an	overlapping	consensus,	intuitions	will	be	questioned,	and	those	“that	 are	 initially	 plausible	 may	 turn	 out,	 on	 further	 investigation,	 to	 be	 mistaken”30.	However,	we	should	not	discard	widely-shared	intuitions	about	the	capabilities	central	to	a	dignified	human	life	solely	on	the	basis	of	the	intuitions	of	individuals	who	have	never	had	 these	 opportunities:	 we	 would	 not	 question	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 capability	 for	economic	empowerment	just	because	women	who	have	not	experienced	it	do	not	value	it.		
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	To	 understand	 why	 we	 should	 be	 concerned	 about	 capability	 deprivation,	 we	 must	consider	what	 the	 central	 capabilities	are.	 Capabilities	 are	 substantive	 opportunities	 to	control	parts	of	our	 life	and,	on	Nussbaum’s	view,	 the	capabilities	 that	are	a	concern	of	justice	are	 those	 that	are	central	 to	a	 flourishing	 life.	A	key	 feature	of	 the	 list	of	 central	capabilities	 is	 that	 it	 is	 not	 immutable	 and	 eternal,	 but	 contingent	 and	 changing.	What	constitutes	a	good	life,	or	the	degree	to	which	we	can	reasonably	expect	to	flourish,	will	vary	depending	on	technological	and	social	advancement.	We	cannot	identify	a	single	list	of	 human	 capabilities	 and	 insist	 that	 justice	 requires	 that	 all	 people,	 at	 all	 times	 and	places,	should	have	these	opportunities,	regardless	of	feasibility.	The	content	of	the	list	–	both	 which	 capabilities	 are	 included,	 and	 what	 it	 means	 to	 possess	 them	 –	 will	 be	determined	by	the	reasonable	expectations	of	those	who	formulate	the	list.			Hence,	the	central	capabilities	five	hundred	years	ago	would	differ	from	the	current	list,	since	 our	 reasonable	 expectations	 concerning	 our	 bodily	 health,	 nourishment	 and	 life	expectancy,	have	changed.	My	suggestion	is	that	our	preferences	are	not	justice	adaptive	if	we	have	the	central	capabilities,	as	currently	defined.	Thus,	 if	16th-century	individuals	possessed	 the	 16th-century	 central	 capabilities	 their	 preferences	 were	 not	 justice	adaptive.	 However,	 if	 the	 Indian	 widows	 Sen	 discussed	 faced	 a	 similar	 degree	 of	deprivation,	and	had	similar	expectations	and	preferences,	their	preferences	were	justice	adaptive	(unreliable	evidence	for	identifying	20th-century	capabilities).			It	may	 seem	strange	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 same	absolute	degree	of	deprivation	 can	make	preferences	unreliable	 in	one	case,	but	not	 in	another.	Yet	when	we	consider	 that	 these	preferences	 are	 considered	 unreliable	 as	 a	 source	 of	 information	 for	 distributive	 policy,	this	seems	less	counterintuitive.	A	well-being	adaptive	preference	is	an	unreliable	guide	to	 our	 best	 interests;	 a	 justice	 adaptive	 preference	 is	 an	 unreliable	 guide	 to	 our	entitlements.	 Both	 the	 16th-century	 individuals	 and	 the	 20th-century	 widows	 may	 be	
better	off	if	they	preferred	and	achieved	better	health,	but	only	the	widows	are	entitled	to	improved	 health.	 Hence,	 only	 the	 widows’	 preferences	 should	 be	 disregarded	 in	determining	the	distributive	entitlements	of	their	contemporaries.			The	focus	on	capability	deprivation,	therefore,	seems	to	capture	our	intuitions	about	such	cases.	The	Indian	widows	were	entitled	to	the	20th-century	capability	for	good	health,	and	the	 fact	 that	 their	 deprivation	 and	mistreatment	 gave	 them	a	 skewed	understanding	of	
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what	good	health	constitutes	should	not	be	taken	as	evidence	that	they	were	not	entitled	to	healthcare,	nor	of	what	the	capability	for	bodily	health	should	constitute.	To	diagnose	an	 individual’s	 preference	 as	 justice	 adaptive,	 suggests	 that	 they	 have	 been	 denied	 an	opportunity	others	have	agreed	to	be	a	central	component	of	a	human	life,	not	that	they	are	irrational.	Thus,	capability	theorists	can	exclude	preferences	without	being	vulnerable	to	the	criticism	that	they	are	making	paternalistic	(and	unjustified)	judgements	regarding	the	competence	of	individuals	to	identify	their	best	interests.	To	illustrate	this	point,	I	will	consider	how	capability	theorists	can	accommodate	disabled	individuals’	preferences.			
4.	Disability	and	Adaptive	Preferences		Barnes	 criticises	 (Nussbaum’s	 version	 of)	 the	 capability	 approach	 for	 assuming	 that	disabled	 individuals	who	value	 their	 disabled	 life	 have	unreliable	 adaptive	preferences.	Barnes	argues	that	only	preferences	 formed	as	 the	result	of	an	 intrinsic	 influence	–	and	usually	for	this	feature	or	influence	–	are	not	adaptive.	Intrinsic	features	are	‘facts	about	who	we	are,	in	and	of	ourselves’,	such	as	our	sex	or	sexuality.	By	contrast,	we	do	have	a	warrant	to	distrust,	and	diagnose	as	adaptive,	preferences	subject	to	extrinsic	influences.	The	 clearest	 examples	 of	 extrinsic	 influences	 are	 “general	 social	 distortion[s]”,	 “social	wrongs	or	 inter-personal	moral	badness”31.	This,	Barnes	argues,	explains	why	we	 judge	the	preferences	of	an	abused	spouse	or	kidnap	victim	to	be	adaptive	–	since	they	prefer	something	 that	 arose	 from	unjust,	 agent-caused	 influences	 –	whilst	 our	preferences	 for	our	sex	or	sexuality	are	reliable	–	even	if	being	female	or	homosexual	makes	our	life	more	difficult	or	‘worse’.	Barnes	insists	disability	is	intrinsic:	“[t]hat	a	person	has	a	disability	is	a	 fact	 about	 herself,	 rather	 than	 a	 social	 distortion…a	 way	 a	 person	 is	 in	 and	 of	themselves”32.	Consequently,	we	should	treat	an	individual’s	preference	to	be	disabled	as	reliable,	as	we	would	their	sexual	preferences.			Although	Barnes’s	focus	on	unjust	treatment	and	deprivation	has	some	intuitive	appeal,	I	believe	drawing	 a	distinction	between	 intrinsic	 and	 extrinsic	 influences	 is	misleading.	 I	have	suggested	that	it	is	an	individual’s	lack	of	central	capabilities	that	gives	us	warrant	to	diagnose	 their	 preferences	 as	 justice	 adaptive.	 Whilst	 this	 often	 arises	 as	 a	 result	 of	externally-imposed	deprivation,	individuals	may	lack	capabilities	as	the	result	of	intrinsic	features	too.	I	will	argue,	then,	that	disability	should	not	be	characterised	as	an	intrinsic	feature	in	every	case	(§4.1),	and	that	it	may	lead	to	the	loss	of	central	capabilities	either	as	the	 result	 of	 extrinsic	or	 intrinsic	 influences.	 In	both	 cases,	 the	 individuals’	 preferences	
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will	be	diagnosed	as	 justice	adaptive,	but	 this	diagnosis	will	not	be	appropriate	 in	most	cases	(§4.2),	and,	even	when	it	is,	will	not	impugn	the	individuals’	agency	(§4.3).			
4.1	Conceptualising	Disability		Barnes’s	 defence	 of	 disabled	 individuals’	 preferences	 depends	 on	 an	 understanding	 of	disability	as	an	intrinsic	feature,	which	requires	her	to	reject	the	social	model	of	disability.	The	social	model	denies	the	necessary	causal	relationship	between	impairment	–	“loss	of	normal	bodily	function”33	–	and	disability	–	“restriction	in	abilities	to	perform	tasks”34.	It	posits	 that	 it	 is	 particular	 social	 practices,	 attitudes,	 and	 institutions	 (i.e.	 extrinsic	
influences)	that	cause	some	impairments	to	be	disabling.	For	example,	deafness	(impaired	hearing)	is	a	disability	only	because	social	structures	are	designed	for	the	hearing.			Whilst	the	social	model	is	popular	amongst	many	in	the	disability	rights	movement,	it	has	also	been	subject	to	a	number	of	criticisms.	Linda	Barclay	argues	that	“it	is	implausible	to	suppose	that	social	justice	for	those	with	disability	can	be	achieved	simply	by	eliminating	discrimination,	or	by	fixing	unacceptably	biased	social	and	institutional	arrangements”35.	She	contends	that	it	may	be	impossible	to	design	entirely	unbiased	social	structures	and	that,	 given	 this,	 it	 may	 not	 be	 unjust	 to	 organise	 a	 society	 to	 suit	 the	 majority	 of	 its	members.	Barnes	criticises	the	social	model	on	the	basis	that	“[i]f,	for	example,	someone	is	 in	 chronic	 pain,	 it	 seems	 that	 no	 amount	 of	 social	 awareness	would	 be	 able	 to	 fully	alleviate	the	ways	in	which	they	suffer	from	their	disability”36.			I	would	not	deny	the	truth	of	either	claim.	It	may	often	be	difficult	or	impossible	to	modify	the	social	structures	that	turn	some	impairments	into	disabilities;	and	some	impairments	may	not	merely	be	contingently	disabling,	but	unavoidably	so.	Yet	this	should	not	lead	us	to	abandon	the	social	model	entirely.	I	suggest	that	the	disparate	experiences	of	disability	cannot	be	conceptualised	as	a	single,	uniform	category,	so	there	is	no	reason	to	think	the	same	 model	 will	 be	 appropriate	 in	 every	 case.	 Chronic	 pain	 may	 not	 be	 alleviated	 by	social	changes,	but	many	impairments	would	be.	I	therefore	propose	that	we	distinguish	disabilities	 that	 can	 be	 characterised	 using	 the	 social	model	 (category	 1,	 hereafter	 C1),	from	those	that	cannot	(category	2,	hereafter	C2).	The	former	are	disabilities	as	the	result	of	extrinsic,	social	causes,	whilst	the	latter	disabilities	are	intrinsic	to	the	condition.37			
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C1	 impairments,	 such	 as	 deafness,	 blindness,	 mobility	 impairments	 and	 dwarfism,	 are	those	most	discussed	 in	 the	 literature	 (including	Barnes’s	work).	These	 conditions	may	necessarily	 involve	 the	 loss	 of	 certain	 opportunities,	 but	 the	 same	 can	 be	 said	 of	 being	born	 tone-deaf,	 or	 ugly,	 or	 clumsy.	 The	 opportunities	 that	 are	 necessarily	 lost	 are	 not	central	capabilities,	and	so	not	disabling,	nor	 the	concern	of	 justice	(§4.2).	For	example,	dwarfism	would	not	be	a	disability	if	average	adult	height	was	4-feet,38	and	we	would	not	consider	 a	 group	 of	 Congolese	 pygmies	 to	 be	 universally	 disabled.39	 Nor	 would	 we	 a	largely	deaf	society	that	communicated	non-verbally.			However,	 unlike	 tone-deafness,	 ugliness	 or	 clumsiness,	 capability	 loss	 is	 frequently	 the	consequence	of	having	C1	conditions	 in	societies	designed	 for	 the	able-bodied	majority:	political	 participation,	 communication,	 mobility,	 bodily	 integrity	 (if	 subject	 to	 attack),	forming	 emotional	 attachments	 (if	 stigmatised	 and	 excluded),	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 use	imagination	and	reason	(if	 improperly	educated).	Deaf	 individuals,	 for	example,	may	be	unable	 to	 engage	 in	 meaningful	 employment,	 receive	 appropriate	 education,	 or	participate	in	society.	It	is	these	extrinsic	consequences	that	are	disabling,	and	for	which	individuals	demand,	and	are	entitled	to,	compensation.	The	intrinsic	features,	meanwhile,	are	 those	 that	many	 claim	 enrich	 their	 lives,	 and	 for	which	 they	want	 neither	 pity	 nor	compensation.	As	Anderson	points	out:		[i]t	is	useful	to	ask	what	the	deaf	demand	on	their	own	account,	in	the	name	of	justice.	 Do	 they	 bemoan	 the	 misery	 of	 not	 being	 able	 to	 hear,	 and	 demand	compensation	for	this	lack?	On	the	contrary…[t]hey	insist	that	sign	language	is	just	as	valuable	a	form	of	communication	as	is	speech	and	that	the	other	goods	obtainable	 through	 hearing,	 such	 as	 appreciation	 of	 music,	 are	 dispensable	parts	of	any	conception	of	good.40	However,	few	claim	the	exclusion,	stigma	and	isolation	that	disabled	people	routinely	face	is	part	of	the	positive	experience	of	disability.41			In	 the	 absence	 of	 this	 contingent	 and	 extrinsically-caused	 capability	 deprivation,	 C1	impairments	 are	 not,	 in	 fact,	 disabling.	 Since	 provision	 of	 the	 central	 capabilities	 is	 the	goal	of	distributive	justice	for	capability	theorists,	a	consequence	of	this	characterisation	is	 that	 C1	 individuals	will	 not	 be	 compensated	 for	 their	 impairment	 itself.	 Thus,	 if,	 for	example,	 we	 removed	 all	 extrinsically-caused	 capability	 deprivation	 associated	 with	deafness,	 and	 a	 ‘cure’	 for	 deafness	 became	 available	 (cochlear	 implants	 are,	 perhaps,	moving	in	this	direction),	individuals	would	not	be	entitled	to	its	provision.	Whilst	many	
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in	the	deaf	community	would	embrace	this	position,	no	doubt	many	others	would	object	to	it.	The	capability	theorist’s	response	may,	therefore,	seem	implausible	and	callous.		However,	 if	 deafness	 did	 not	 involve	 capability	 loss,	 what	 would	 we	 compensate	 deaf	individuals	for?	We	think	it	a	great	tragedy	to	lose	our	hearing,	and	be	unable	to	listen	to	music	or	hear	the	voices	of	our	loved	ones.	Yet	this	is	not	why	we	provide	compensation.	It	may	seem,	to	many,	a	great	tragedy	to	become	very	ugly,	and	many	ugly	people	may	opt	for	a	‘cure’.	However,	this	does	not	imply	individuals	are	entitled	to	be	beautiful	(or	else	compensation).	There	is	no	reason,	then,	to	think	C1	impairments	are	particularly	tragic,	or	 necessarily	 involve	 capability	 loss.42	 It	 is,	 rightly,	 the	 contingent,	 socially-caused	capability	deprivation	for	which	we	compensate	in	these	cases.43			However,	not	all	impairments	are	merely	contingently	disabling.	Some	conditions,	such	as	chronic	pain	or	severe	paralysis,	do	necessarily	entail	the	loss	of	central	capabilities,	and	so	are	 intrinsically	disabling.	These	C2	disabilities	cannot	be	characterised	by	the	social	model,	and	Barnes	is	right	that	they	will	not	be	‘alleviated’	by	increased	social	awareness	and	 revised	 social	 structures.	 C1	 and	 C2	 cannot	 always	 be	 clearly	 distinguished,	 as	mobility	 impairments	 illustrate.	Without	aid	(for	example,	a	wheelchair),	we	may	 lack	a	central	 capability	 (mobility),	 and	 so	 consider	 this	 C2.	 However,	 once	 a	 wheelchair	 has	been	provided	the	case	becomes	C1:	we	possess	the	central	capabilities	absent	extrinsic	biases,	 such	as	public	buildings	not	being	wheelchair-accessible.	Clearer	cases	of	C2	are	those	 when	 we	 lack	 the	 technology	 to	 provide	 the	 lost	 capability,	 and	 this	 is	 how	 I	understand	 the	 category:	 impairments	 that	 are	 non-contingently	 and	 unavoidably	disabling.			
4.2	Which	Preferences	Can	We	Rely	On?			I	 will	 now	 consider	 how	 capability	 theorists	 respond	 to	 the	 preferences	 of	 C1	 and	 C2	individuals.	 First,	 I	 will	 argue	 that,	 contrary	 to	 Barnes’s	 claims,	 in	 most	 instances	capability	theorists	would	not	exclude	disabled	individuals’	preferences	(and	rightly	so).	Barnes	 argued	 that	 since	 disabled	 individuals	 lack	 the	 capability	 for	 some	 central	functionings	–	such	as	bodily	integrity,	physical	health,	mobility,	or	the	use	of	their	senses	–	 to	 value	 their	 life	 is	 to	 repudiate	 the	 central	 capabilities.44	 On	 Nussbaum’s	 account,	valuing	this	sub-optimal	life	is	sufficient	reason	to	diagnose	their	preferences	as	adaptive.	Accordingly,	we	have	the	vicious	circle,	in	which	individuals’	preferences	are	not	reliable	
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enough	to	determine	the	list	of	central	capabilities	unless	they	already	value	them.	I	have	argued	for	a	more	proceduralist	approach,	according	to	which	we	must	have	(not	value)	the	central	capabilities.	We	must	experience	an	opportunity	widely	considered	essential	to	 flourishing	before	our	rejection	of	 it	 can	be	considered	reliable.	Yet	on	my	view,	 too,	disabled	 individuals’	 preferences	 will	 be	 excluded	 if	 Barnes	 is	 right	 that	 they	 cannot	function,	since	they	then	lack	experience	of	central	capabilities.			However,	 despite	 Barnes’s	 claims,	 individuals	 with	 C1	 impairments	 both	 possess	 and	value	 the	 central	 capabilities,	 so	 there	 will	 be	 no	 reason	 to	 exclude	 them	 on	 either	Nussbaum’s	view,	or	my	own.	Barnes’s	 suggestion	only	makes	sense	 if	we	adopt	a	very	restrictive	(and	implausible)	interpretation	of	capabilities.	For	example,	Barnes	suggests	that	 blind	 and	 deaf	 individuals	 lack	 the	 capability	 to	 use	 their	 senses.	 However,	 the	sensory	 experiences	 of	 blind	 and	 deaf	 people	 form	 a	 large	 part	 of	 their	 positive	experience	of	their	condition.	Consider	a	first-person	account	that	Barnes	herself	quotes:		My	world	is	built	of	touch-sensations,	devoid	of	physical	colour	and	sound;	but	without	 colour	 and	 sound,	 it	 breathes	 and	 throbs	 with	 life.	 Every	 object	 is	associated	in	my	mind	with	tactual	qualities	which,	combined	in	countless	ways	give	me	a	sense	of	power,	or	of	beauty,	or	of	incongruity…45		Such	 accounts	 make	 clear	 that	 though	 C1	 individuals	 may	 experience	 the	 central	functionings	 differently,	 they	 do	 not	 possess	 or	 value	 them	 any	 less	 than	 able-bodied	people.	Whilst	someone	who	is	blind	and/or	deaf	may	miss	out	on	some	forms	of	sensory	experience,	so	may	someone	who	is	not.	As	the	same	account	continues:	“[r]emember	that	you,	dependent	on	your	sight,	do	not	realise	how	many	things	are	tangible”46.			There	 is	no	 reason,	 then,	 to	 think	 that	 the	 capability	 to	 “use	 the	 senses”47	 should	mean	using	 all	 five	 senses.	 Remember	 that	 the	 central	 capabilities	 are	 those	 essential	 to	 a	dignified	 human	 life.	 The	 burden	 of	 proof	 surely	 lies	 with	 those	 who	 suggest	 that	 the	nature	 of	 the	 capabilities	 possessed	 by	 C1	 individuals	 (absent	 extrinsic	 influences)	renders	their	lives	undignified,	and	I	see	no	reason	to	think	this	is	the	case.	Thus,	to	have	a	C1	impairment,	and	prefer	this	life,	does	not	involve	repudiating	the	central	capabilities.	Consequently,	 such	 individuals	 do	 not	 have	 preferences	 for	 the	 ‘wrong’	 thing	 (on	Nussbaum’s	view),	nor	have	they	formed	them	under	the	 ‘wrong’	circumstances	(on	my	own).	In	neither	case,	therefore,	would	their	preferences	be	considered	justice	adaptive,	and	unreliable	evidence	for	determining	the	central	capabilities.48			
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	Although	preferences	 for	 intrinsic	 features	of	C1	 impairments	will	not	be	excluded,	 this	does	not	mean	 the	 capability	 approach	need	do	nothing	 further	 to	 accommodate	 them.	More	explicit	emphasis	should,	perhaps,	be	placed	on	the	different	ways	capabilities	can	be	 exercised	 to	 ensure	 individuals	 possess	 them	 even	 if	 this	 requires	 non-standard	support.	For	example,	though	deaf	individuals	possess	the	capability	to	use	their	senses,	their	capability	for	practical	reason,	imagination	and	thought	may	be	in	jeopardy	if	their	education	 focuses	 on	 teaching	 them	 to	 lip-read	 and	 speak,	 at	 the	 expense	of	 using	 sign	language	 and	 promoting	 their	 broader	 education.	 Thus,	 given	 capability	 theorists’	concern	to	represent	the	voices	of	marginalised	groups,	they	should,	perhaps,	give	greater	prominence	 to	 the	 experience	 of	 C1	 impairment	 in	 the	 specification	 of	 the	 central	capabilities.	 However,	 there	 is	 nothing	 in	 this	 experience	 that	 suggests	we	must	 either	alter	the	content	of	the	list,	or	exclude	these	experiences.		C1	impairments,	then,	do	not	prevent	individuals	having	the	central	capabilities,	and	any	capability	deprivation	they	do	suffer	is	largely	avoidable,	either	by	removing	biases,	or	via	more	 direct	 compensation.	When	 capability	 deprivation	 is	 avoided,	 capability	 theorists	will	 not	 consider	 their	 preferences	 justice	 adaptive	 (nor	 provide	 them	 with	 further	compensation).	However,	when	individuals	have	not	experienced	the	central	capabilities,	their	preferences	 should	not	 guide	a	 theory	of	 justice,	 as	 I	will	 now	consider.	This	may	arise	either	as	the	result	of	an	extrinsic	influence	on	an	individual	with	a	C1	impairment,	or	as	the	intrinsic	consequence	of	a	C2	impairment.			
4.3	Which	Preferences	Should	We	Distrust?		First,	 if	 C1	 individuals,	 in	 circumstances	 that	deprive	 them	of	 central	 capabilities,	 insist	these	 opportunities	 are	 inessential	 to	 flourishing,	 then	 these	 preferences	 should	 be	excluded	from	the	overlapping	consensus.	We	should	not	allow	unjust	treatment	to	lower	individuals’	 expectations	 until	 they	 are	 entitled	 to	 nothing	 more,	 and	 nor	 should	 this	determine	 the	 capabilities	 others	 are	 entitled	 to.	 For	 example,	 if	 some	 deaf	 individuals	adapted	 to	 the	 inaccessibility	of	meaningful	work,	 until	 they	preferred	a	 life	without	 it,	and	considered	this	opportunity	inessential	to	a	decent	human	life,	this	gives	us	no	reason	to	 think	 no	 one	 is	 entitled	 to	 this	 opportunity.	 Their	 preferences	 in	 this	 case	 are	 not	appropriately	informed,	and	so	are	justice	adaptive,	and	should	not	be	used	to	identify	the	central	capabilities.	This	does	not	imply	their	preferences	are	irrational:	it	may	be	rational	
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for	a	deaf	person	to	conclude	that	the	opportunity	for	meaningful	work	is	unimportant	or	inessential	to	flourishing,	and	pursue	goals	that	do	not	require	this,	if	they	will	never	have	this	option.			Although	these	preferences	will	not	inform	our	distributive	entitlements,	then,	capability	theorists	 would	 not	 judge	 the	 individuals	 who	 hold	 them	 to	 be	 defective	 agents,	 and	would	 consider	 their	 preferences	 once	 they	 had	been	provided	with	 opportunities	 that	biased	 social	 structures	 have	 deprived	 them	 of.	 The	 second	 set	 of	 problematic	 cases,	however,	are	ones	in	which	we	cannot	claim	that	with	better	treatment,	compensation,	or	altered	social	structures	or	attitudes,	 individuals	could	have	the	central	capabilities,	and	so	 reliable	 (not	 justice	 adaptive)	 preferences.	 These	 are	 C2	 cases,	 where	 capability	deprivation	is	the	necessary	consequence	of	an	impairment.	As	long	as	individuals	claim	that	their	life	–	with	a	C2	disability,	and	so	without	a	central	capability	–	is	flourishing,	we	have	a	warrant	to	diagnose	their	preferences	as	justice	adaptive.			Therefore,	 though	 Barnes	 is	 wrong	 to	 suggest	 that	 capability	 theorists	 exclude	 the	 C1	individuals	 on	 whom	 she	 focuses,	 do	 they	 nonetheless	 unjustifiably	 exclude	 a	 group’s	conception	of	the	good	on	the	basis	that	we	judge	their	life	sub-optimal?	We	should	first	point	out	that	few	individuals	actually	have	the	sort	of	preferences	that	concern	us.	Even	those	who	adapt	to,	and	accept,	chronic	pain	or	complete	paralysis	are	unlikely	to	reject	the	 value	 of	 the	 opportunity	 for	 mobility,	 or	 a	 life	 free	 from	 avoidable	 pain.49	 These	individuals	are	not	amongst	those	defending	their	way	of	life	as	a	valuable	culture,	which	should	inform	our	view	of	what	constitutes	human	flourishing.	Thus,	there	is	no	existing	minority	cultural	group	whose	preferences	are	ignored.			However,	given	such	preferences	are	possible,	how	should	we	respond?	I	contend	that	we	would	be	justified	in	saying	that	their	experience	of	 life	 is	sufficiently	different	from	the	‘norm’	 that	 their	 testimony	 would	 not	 constitute	 a	 reliable	 guide	 to	 the	 capabilities	appropriate	 for	 others	 (just	 as	 the	 preferences	 of	 16th-century	 individuals	would	 be	 an	unreliable	guide	to	modern	distributive	policies).50	This	is	not	to	suggest	these	individuals	are	 irrational,	 that	 their	 lives	 are	 worthless,	 or	 even	 that	 their	 preferences	 are	 an	unreliable	 guide	 to	 their	 interests	 (well-being	 adaptive).51	 It	 is	 simply	 to	point	 out	 that	although	 the	 capability	 approach	 is	 intended	 to	 be	 universally	 applicable,	 in	 those	 rare	cases	in	which	people	have	an	experience	of	human	life	radically	different	from	the	norm,	their	preferences	should	not,	perhaps,	be	allowed	to	veto	capabilities	considered	central	
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by	 everyone	 else.	 If	 individuals	 were	 to	 claim	 that	 freedom	 from	 pain	 or	 mobility	 are	inessential	to	flourishing	because	they	had	adapted	to	their	experiences,	should	this	really	determine	what	we	are	owed	as	a	matter	of	justice?		
5.	Conclusion		The	 distinction	 between	 justice,	 and	 well-being,	 adaptive	 preferences	 has	 significance	beyond	 capability	 theorists’	 treatment	 of	 disability,	 and,	 indeed,	 beyond	 the	 capability	approach	 itself.	 I	 contend	 that	 it	 is	 relevant	 to	 any	 non-welfarist	 theory	 of	 distributive	justice,	and	will	enable	the	more	accurate	analysis	of	many	individuals’	preferences.	The	specific	application	I	have	considered	is	illustrative	of	how	these	two	sorts	of	adaptation	come	 apart.	 Focussing	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 justice	 –	 as	 distinct	 from	well-being	 –	 adaptation	allows	 us	 to	 set	 aside	 some	 preferences	 in	 the	 domain	 of	 justice,	 without	 questioning	individuals’	rational	agency	or	their	ability	to	determine	how	their	life	should	go.	We	can,	therefore,	 conclude	 that	 some	 disabled	 people’s	 preferences	 should	 not	 inform	 our	distributive	 entitlements,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 disrespect	 their	 agency,	 or	 undermine	 their	culture,	to	say	so.			
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and	Persons	 (Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1986),	pp.351-379).	The	view	of	disability	as	tragic	may	be	less	widespread	if	we	separated	what	it	necessarily	means	to	have	a	(C1)	impairment,	from	what	it	happens	to	mean	in	our	society.		43	Given	the	difficulty	of	removing	bias,	we	may	in	practice,	always	compensate	C1	individuals.	For	example,	providing	cochlear	implants	rather	than	demanding	everyone	learn	(every	dialect?)	of	sign	language.	44	Barnes	op.	cit.	2009a,	p.2;	p.18.		45	Keller	in	Barnes	op.	cit.	2009a,	p.15.		46	Keller	in	Barnes	op.	cit.	2009a,	p.15.	47	Nussbaum	op.	cit.	2011,	p.33	48	Their	preference	may	be	well-being	adaptive,	and	so	fall	into	category	(ii)	(see	§3.1).		49	 Research	 into	 disabled	 individuals’	 preferences	 tends	 to	 focus	 on	 their	 assessment	 of	 their	 own	well-being	 (e.g.	 H.	 Breivik,	 et	 al.,	 ‘Survey	 of	 Chronic	 Pain	 in	 Europe:	 Prevalence,	 impact	 on	 daily	 life,	 and	treatment’,	European	Journal	of	Pain	10,	4	(2006);	O.	Gureje,	et	al.,	‘Persistent	Pain	and	Well-Being:	A	World	Health	Organisation	Study	in	Primary	Care’,	The	Journal	of	the	American	Medical	Association	280,	2	(1998);	A.	 Stewart,	et	al.,	 ‘Functional	Status	and	Well-being	of	Patients	with	Chronic	Conditions:	Results	 from	 the	
23	
																																																																																																																																																																																Medical	Outcomes	Study’,	The	Journal	of	the	American	Medical	Association	262,	7	(1989)).	I	am	unaware	of	any	research	that	considers	whether	this	leads	individuals	to	repudiate	those	capabilities	they	lack.			50	 It	 is	worth	 emphasising	 that	what	 constitutes	 the	 ‘norm’	 is	 understood	 in	 a	 non-normative	 sense	 and,	further,	 that	what	 counts	 as	 normal	 is	 broadly	 construed:	 individuals	with	 a	wide-range	 of	 impairments	(indeed,	all	C1	impairments)	live	a	normal	life	on	this	classification.		51	A	paralysed	individual	may	consciously	repudiate	activities	involving	mobility,	and	come	to	prefer	more	cerebral	pleasures,	such	that	they	would	not	be	better	off	if	they	repudiated	their	preference	for	paralysis	and	achieved	mobility.		
